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INTRODUCTION 
Since the industrial revolution, states have been growing more dependent on energy 
resources for their economic growth. Usually a disruption of energy supplies means a 
distorted economic growth and large social unrests (Newnham, 2011). Some 
countries have the availability of large amounts of natural resources on their national 
territory, while many other states are ‘energy poor’, thus are dependent on energy 
supplies from other states. Europe is a region that is considered relatively energy 
poor which makes that a lot of countries are dependent on supplies from Russia or 
the Middle East (Smith, Hadfield & Dunne, 2012: 445).  A region within Europe which 
is most concerned regarding these problems, are the countries that were part of the 
former Soviet Union (Grigas, 2016). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, every 
newly formed republic followed its own path of development towards different 
objectives. Of these newly independent states, a group of states that is quite unique 
in its development, especially regarding energy politics, is the Baltic Region.  
 
Many former Soviet republics have always been largely dependent on energy 
imports, mainly from Russia. In recent years, energy related policy-issues, which 
together are often referred to as energy security issues, gained more priority within 
the political arena in the former Soviet sphere (Maigre, 2010). The higher priority of 
energy related issues in this area is mainly caused by the fact that since the year 
2000.  Russia has actively used its position as the main energy-supplier of many 
former Soviet republics as a tool of economic sanctioning, to influence domestic 
politics in the targeted states (Newnham, 2011). In countries like Ukraine, Belarus 
and Moldova, Russia used energy prices and deliveries as a tool to punish or reward 
governments for their policies towards Russia (Simao, 2016). What makes The Baltic 
region unique in comparison to most other former Soviet countries is that despite 
their status as ‘energy poor’ countries is that they have not been as vulnerable to 
Russia’s energy politics as the most other former Soviet republics. A possible 
explanation for this variance in vulnerability among the former Soviet republics is the 
EU membership of the Baltic States. In order to comply with EU standards, the Baltic 
States had to implement rigorous reforms in their domestic energy markets, a 
process that kept continuing even after 2004. These were often quite thorough and 
could sort a large effect on the energy sector and energy security of the Baltic States.  
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To explain this difference, I will conduct a single case study, and answer the 
question: How did EU membership affect the energy security of the Baltic States? 
Earlier research on this topic, both academic- and policy oriented, was merely 
focusing on specific elements of the development of the Baltic States’ energy security 
after their EU membership. Yet no academic research has been dedicated to the 
effects of EU membership itself, but rather focused towards the effects of specific 
energy policies in the region, not specifically related to EU membership. Analyzing 
the effectiveness of different aspects of EU membership on energy security can 
contribute to how future energy-related policies are shaped. Knowing that many 
Central and Eastern European countries have a high dependency on energy imports 
(Newnham, 2012), these countries could learn from the (possible) mistakes or 
improvements that have been made in the Baltic States since 2004. In the first 
chapter of this thesis, an overview of scientific literature on the concept of energy 
security will be presented, followed by an introduction on EU policies regarding this 
subject. Thereafter I will shortly present my research methods. In the main part of this 
thesis my findings on the effects of EU membership on the different aspects of 
energy security will be analyzed and explained, which will be summarized and 
discussed in the last section 
ENERGY SECURITY AND POLITICS  
Controlling and securing energy resources have always been incentives for state- or 
non-state actors to engage in conflict with each other. In the last few decades, strong 
economic growth in numerous Asian and African countries has only intensified 
conflict and competition over energy resources, which is often referred to as the 
strive for ‘energy security’ (Bahgat, 2006: Lekka & Kyriazes, 2013). Energy security 
can be defined in various ways, but a common used definition comes from the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), which defines energy security as ‘The 
uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price’ (IEA, 2017). 
Energy security as defined by the IEA can be divided into two elements; ‘stability of 
supply’ and ‘volatility of prices’, two concepts that are strongly interrelated. The 
stability of supply can be negatively affected when an energy-exporting country 
experiences huge political instability, which harms its energy producing capability 
massively and also affecting its supplying capacity (Jewell, 2011: 11). 
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A recent example of this phenomenon is the uprising in 2011 in Libya and the 
following civil war. Because of the political instability Libya’s oil production and 
exports decreased enormously (El Katiri et al. 2014: 10-11).This will result in political 
instability and unrest on international markets, leading to highly volatile energy prices 
(Ratner, 2011: 2-3). Political unrests are not the only events that could affect a states’ 
energy security. Winzer (2012) conceptualizes energy security as a factor of 
numerous risk dimensions. The first risk dimension are the ‘technical risk sources’ 
and relate to the failure of energy infrastructure, like transmission lines or power 
plants due to technical failures or unintended human errors (Winzer, 2012: 37). 
‘Natural risk’ events, the second category, are events like the exhaustion of fossil 
energy resources, or natural disasters that harm the production or supplying capacity 
of a state (Winzer, 2012: 37).The third, and most researched dimension of energy 
security in the political science as defined by Winzer, is the ‘human risk dimension’. 
The human risk dimension is very closely related to the concept ‘stability of supply’ as 
defined by the IEA (Winzer, 2012). Intentional and unintentional events, like political 
unrests or a boycott, that influence energy markets are the two main elements of the 
human risk dimension. A boycott on certain natural resources can be a very effective 
tool of exploiting the human risk dimension in an actors’ benefit in order to achieve 
political goals (Smith, Hadfield & Dunne, 2012: 446). One reason why exploiting the 
human risk dimension by using energy resources can be a very effective strategy in 
harming another states’ energy security and economy, is the overall lack of 
alternative energy resources or suppliers (Smith, Hadfield & Dunne, 2012: 447). Oil 
and natural gas, the main energy resources for export markets, are only supplied by 
a limited number of countries. In the case of natural gas an extra factor increases its 
effectiveness as a tool of coercion, since in order to transport gas, a very intensive 
infrastructure of pipeline is necessary (Newnham, 2011: 135-136). Constructing this 
infrastructure is very costly and time consuming, which makes energy dependent 
countries very vulnerable for abrupt supply interruptions. Additionally, no alternative 
product is available on the short-term which can replace oil and gas if necessary 
(Newnham, 2011: 135).  
In most cases, economic sanctioning as described earlier is a two-sided coin; it 
harms the state that is targeted, but it also can harm the state that is using economic 
coercion. However, if the total export market of the ‘sender’ of economic sanctions is 
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larger than the import market of the ‘receiver’, the effectiveness of economic 
sanctions is likely to be higher, since the economic damage will be bigger for an 
energy importing state that loses its main energy supplier, than for an energy 
exporting state which loses just a minor export market (Hufbauer et al.1990: 89-90). 
In a relationship between an energy demanding state and an energy supplying state, 
this imbalance is often present, and will heavily favor the position of energy supplying 
states, since supplying countries can rely on a broad scale of customers for their 
income (Grigas, 2017: 18-19).  
For many European countries, this imbalance between supplying and demanding 
countries is a challenge since a lot of European countries are not self-sufficient in its 
energy provision (World Bank, 2017). In the last few decades, European countries 
have been threatened and affected with economic sanctions through the use of 
energy resources both directly and indirectly (Grigas, 2017: 22). The first major case 
in which energy resources were being used as a tool to influence political behavior 
was in 1973. In this year, numerous oil exporting states in the Middle-East boycotted 
the United States and some of its allies because of their support for Israel during the 
Yom Kippur war against Egypt. Oil prices increased with 400 percent, and many 
western leaders feared an oil shortage in their countries (Rustow, 1975: 72). While 
the effectiveness of this oil embargo is debatable, the threats of 1973 changed the 
way governments think about energy security. Oil importing countries were looking 
for opportunities to diversify their suppliers and also were seeking alternative sources 
of energy (Rustow, 1975). However, that the process of diversification in Europe was 
not very successful was proven in 2006, when Europe was confronted with a conflict 
between Ukraine and Russia. An ongoing dispute between the Russian state-led 
company Gazprom and the Ukrainian government about debts and gas prices led to 
a shutdown of gas deliveries to Ukraine during the first days of 2006, This conflict did 
not only affect the Ukrainian gas market, but also those of numerous EU member 
states which were almost fully dependent on Russian gas, reporting a decrease in 
gas deliveries (Lee, 2013: 588). Lower gas deliveries to these countries were caused 
because Ukraine is a so called ‘transit state’ which means that the pipeline 
infrastructure in its territory is needed to transfer natural gas to other parts of Europe. 
Ukraine and Russia both accused each other for sabotaging the sgas deliveries to 
Europe, but it never became clear who was responsible (Lee, 2013: 588-589) It is 
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argued that there was a strong political dimension in this conflict, and that Russia 
tried to influence domestic politics by undermining Ukraine’s energy security 
(Newnham, 2013). While this was the first time that Europe was affected by a conflict 
between Russia and a former Soviet republic, it was certainly not the first time that 
Russia used natural gas to achieve political goals. Since 2000, Russia raised gas 
prices several times for ‘western oriented’ former Soviet republics, while ‘Russia 
oriented’ countries were rewarded with huge discounts (Newnham, 2011: 137) 
EU ENERGY SECURITY POLICIES 
The gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine more or less forced the EU to come up 
with a strategy regarding its energy security (Maigre, 2010: 2). In formulating an 
European strategy regarding energy security, the European Commission 
distinguishes between energy security in ‘short term security’ and ‘long term security’. 
Short term security is a concept that is used when talked about the risk of abrupt 
disruptions of gas or oil deliveries from the EU’s main suppliers, and what effect it 
has on the economies of the EU member states. Long term security regards the 
overall structure of the EU’s energy market, covering elements such as: energy 
production, energy efficiency, diversification and infrastructure for the redirection of 
energy resources (European Commission, 2017). In order to achieve a higher degree 
of energy security, the EU has set a couple of priorities in their 2020 Energy Strategy 
Plan: 
 
-Making Europe more energy efficient through investments into efficient buildings, 
products, and transport. 
-Building a pan-European energy market by constructing transmission lines, 
pipelines, LNG terminals, and other infrastructure.   
-Accelerate the development and deployment of low carbon technologies  
-Pursuing good relations with the EU's external energy suppliers and energy transit 
countries. (2020 Energy Strategy, 2010).  
While the 2020 Energy Strategy Plan concerns all EU members, energy security 
interests differ greatly among them. When looking at dependency on energy imports 
there are large differences within the EU (European Commission, 2016). A region 
that is traditionally very dependent on energy imports and whose energy 
infrastructure was not connected with the rest of Europe for a long time which 
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prevented the region to import energy from other EU countries, is the Baltic region 
(Balmaceda, 2013: 209). Since their independence, and even more after EU 
accession the Baltic States have developed a very unstable relationship with Russia, 
which is also their main energy supplier. (Hanson, 2013: 2-3). At the same time, 
many reforms were needed in the Baltic States in order to comply with EU standards. 
All these domestic and international elements that are affected by EU membership 
should not be seen separately from each other. As showed in the literature review, 
domestic events could have drastic effects on multilateral relations between energy 
supplying and energy demanding countries. Most academic research on energy 
security focuses on explaining how specific events can cause a decrease in a states’ 
energy security, but very few focuses on how energy security can be increased. 
While energy security in many former Soviet republics has been negatively 
challenged by external forces way in recent years, it has been relatively stable in the 
Baltic States. EU strategy on energy markets is very ambitious. As energy poor 
states with a low developed internal energy market prior to their EU membership, the 
Baltic region is an interesting region to test if EU policies on energy security are any 
effective. Therefore, I will test the following hypothesis; EU membership has a 
positive effect on the energy security of the Baltic States.  
This research also differs from existing literature, in that energy security is not 
analyzed as just a factor of just external factors, but also takes internal economic and 
political factors into consideration. These internal and external elements of energy 
security altogether form the level of energy security in a country. Based on the 
existing literature and the EU 2020 strategy, I defined four elements of energy 
security; energy efficiency, domestic diversification and production, import 
diversification and production and the relationship with Russia. For the Baltic States, 
these elements represent the most important aspects of energy security, and 
together form the four key pillars of the hypothesized causal mechanism in which EU 
membership leads to changes in one or more of the elements of energy security, 
influencing the energy security of the Baltic States, either positive or negative 
CASE SELECTION, CONCEPTUALIZATION AND METHODS 
In order to test the hypothesis of this thesis, a qualitative case study will be 
conducted in the form of process tracing. The reason that a qualitative study is 
chosen instead of a quantitative, is that a qualitative study is more suitable to explain 
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a possible casual mechanism. In this thesis, I chose to conduct a single case study 
on the Republic of Lithuania. While basic characteristics of the Baltic States 
regarding energy security are relatively similar, Lithuania differs from the other Baltic 
States in relation to energy security in a number of aspects. Lithuania, contrary to 
Estonia, doesn’t have large oil reserves in its territory which makes it more 
dependent on oil imports. (Maigre, 2010: 3). Latvia, on the other hand has the 
availability over a large gas storage facility, built during the Soviet era, which forms 
an important element of its energy security. (Maigre, 2010: 4). However, the most 
important difference between the Lithuania vis a vis Estonia and Latvia, is that since 
their EU accession in 2004, net energy import dependency in Estonia and Latvia 
decreased, while in the same period Lithuania’s import dependency increased 
(Eurostat, 2017). Based on these facts, Lithuania is the least likely case to confirm 
the hypothesis for this thesis, and therefore the most relevant case in order to 
analyze the relationship between EU membership and energy security.  
EU membership has two main policy dimensions for Lithuania. In order to join the 
EU, Lithuania had to comply with EU regulations regarding environmental issues and 
regulations of domestic energy markets. On the other hand, EU membership gives 
the opportunity to operate within the EU legal framework, but also to apply for EU 
funds which are meant to develop energy-related projects. Based on the definitions 
as used by the IEA, EU, and numerous models provided in the academic literature 
(see Sovacool & Mukherjee, 2011, Chalvatzis & Ionnadis, 2017, Zeng et al. 2017), I 
defined four elements in order to measure the energy security of Lithuania. The first 
element is ‘production diversification and capacity’. Production diversification and 
capacity means the amount of energy a country is able to produce, and how the 
production is diversified among different sourcess. The second element is ‘energy 
efficiency’. To measure energy efficiency, I will analyze how Lithuania has managed 
its energy consumption after it became an EU member, and what measures the 
government has undertaken in order to decrease the domestic energy consumption. 
‘Import dependency and diversification’ is the third element, related to which extend 
foreign energy supplies are available. Important diversification is measured by 
looking at the energy suppliers that are available for Lithuania, but also the 
infrastructure for energy imports is relevant in determining this variable. The fourth 
and last variable is defined as ‘relationship with Russia. To determine this element, I 
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will analyze the impact of Lithuania’s EU membership on bilateral relations with 
Russia, and if any incentives were created to use energy as a foreign policy tool for 
Russia. As the literature showed, harming a state’s energy security can be a very 
effective way of economic coercion. The reason that only the relationship with Russia 
will be analyzed is based on the literature review that showed that relations with 
Russia have been one of the most dominant factors in the energy security for the ex-
Soviet countries. Data for this research will be retrieved from different sources. Policy 
reports of both the EU and the Lithuanian government, combined with data from 
organizations as the World Bank and the International Energy Agency, will be the 
main sources for this thesis 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN LITHUANIA 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, energy efficiency in Lithuania was at a very 
low level, both in the residential and the industrial sector (Balmaceda, 2013: 211). 
This low level was due to the highly subsidized energy prices. During the Soviet era 
Lithuania was very dependent on oil and gas imports from other Soviet Republics in 
fulfilling its domestic energy demand. Energy prices in the Soviet Union were highly 
subsidized and were sold for a fraction of the regular market price (Streimikiene et al. 
2008: 775). Because of these low prices, incentives to increase energy efficiency 
were very low. After Lithuania’s independency however, energy prices rose rapidly 
towards market levels, forcing the Lithuanian government to improve its energy 
efficiency in order to control government spending on energy imports (Streimikiene et 
al. 2008: 774-775). One important measure was the deregulation of prices for most 
oil-based products, but also the gas and electricity prices were deregulated 
(Balmaceda, 2013: 216). As a result, energy usage decreased sharply in Lithuania. 
While there was a slight increase in its first year of independence in 1991, energy 
usage in relation to Lithuania’s GDP, referred to as ‘energy intensity’, decreased up 
to 50% until 2004 (World Bank, 2017). While this can be partly explained as a 
success of government policies, economic problems faced by almost all former 
Soviet republics also are likely to have influenced the decrease in energy intensity.   
Lithuania was one of the former Soviet republics that was very committed to 
reforming its economy in order to be able to join the EU. One of the first major 
reforms based on EU regulations that was implied in Lithuania, was the EU directive 
2002/91 on the Energy Performance of Buildings (Law on Energy, 2002: 33). The 
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goal of this directive was to promote the improvement of energy performance of 
buildings within the EU (Directive 2002/91: 67). For instance, the walls of buildings 
had to be constructed and isolated according to certain standards, so that the 
buildings became more energy efficient (Directive 2002/91: 68-69). Another measure 
from this directive was the labeling of buildings into categories based on their energy 
usage, which was meant to create more awareness about energy efficiency. The 
measures as described in Directive 2002/91 became part of a broader EU strategy to 
decrease energy consumption with 9% until 2014 (Directive 2006/32). While there 
was no legal mechanism to force EU members to decrease their energy use, 
Lithuania decreased its energy consumption with almost 25% from 2008 to 2015, 
higher than Directive 2006/32 threshold (European Commission, 2017).  
One of Lithuania’s first detailed policy documents on a broader energy efficiency 
strategy since its EU membership was the ‘National Energy-Efficiency Program for 
2006-2010’ (NEEP). An important mean for Lithuania to achieve its energy efficiency 
goals as described in this plan. were the different EU structural funds (NEEP, 2007: 
23). These funds are an important EU instrument to help new member-states 
restructure their economy (Streimikiene et al. 2005: 1172). Total energy savings until 
2010, resulting from the measures taken by the Lithuanian government were 0.067 
Mtoe, almost 1% of the yearly energy consumption in Lithuania according to the 
Lithuanian Energy Efficiency Action Plan (EEAP, 2014: 12). Measures as described 
in the NEEP to improve energy efficiency can be divided into two categories: 
horizontal measures (measures concerning all sectors), and sector specific 
measures. The main difference between these two categories is the amount of 
energy saved because of measures taken for this category. Almost 70% of the total 
energy savings were achieved by taking horizontal measures (EEAP, 2014: 12). A 
second difference between these two categories, are the financial underpinnings. 
Most of the sector-specific measures are taken with financial support of numerous 
EU funds, while the horizontal measures were in most of the cases an 
implementation of certain EU legislations and directives that did not require the 
allocation of specific financial resources (EEAP, 2014: 13, 34, 43).  
When looking at the development of energy intensity in Lithuania since its EU 
membership, a relatively stable trend downwards in visible. However, the period 
2009-2010, showed a rapid decline of more than 30% in one year (World Bank, 
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2017). This can be explained by the closing of the Ignalina Power Plant in 2009, 
which was agreed on by Lithuania and the EU in their negotiations over EU 
membership (Balmaceda, 2013: 223-224). The Ignalina nuclear plant was very 
energy inefficient, and closing this plant had positive effects on Lithuania’s energy 
intensity. Also, by closing this nuclear plant Lithuania lost its biggest domestic source 
of energy production (Maigre, 2010: 5), which could have implications for its domestic 
energy production capacity and import dependency. This will be analyzed more 
detailed in a the next chapter.  
Certain admission requirements like the closing of the nuclear plant and requirements 
regarding the energy efficiency of buildings had a great impact on Lithuania’s energy 
efficiency. Nevertheless, when comparing the period between 1990 and 2004, and 
2000 until 2017, Lithuania’s energy efficiency increased strong on a more structural 
basis before 2004, while after 2004, the increase was less strong. This difference 
between the period prior, and after 2004, can be mainly explained by the strong 
increase in energy prices in the 90s, forming a strong incentive to minimize energy 
use. EU structural funds seem to resort little effects on Lithuania’s energy efficiency, 
but EU legislation and admission requirements had a much stronger effect. 
Concluding, it can be argued that EU membership had a positive effect on Lithuania’s 
energy efficiency, although its energy intensity is still above the European average 
(Vasaukaite & Streimikiene, 2014: 638). Effects of EU membership on an increased 
energy efficiency and Lithuania’s energy security are positive, but rather limited when 
compared with the effects of the other three factors that will be analyzed in the 
following chapters. 
DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND DIVERSIFICATION  
Before independence, issues regarding production, transmission and diversification 
of energy resources were never a priority for the Lithuanian government because 
domestic energy infrastructures were mainly financed and operated by the central 
Soviet government (Balmaceda, 2007: 2). As already briefly discussed in the last 
section, Lithuania’s main source of domestic energy production until 2009 was the 
Ignalina nuclear power plant. During the Soviet era this plant was mainly operated by 
Russian engineers, but most of them left after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
(Augutis et al, 2011: 6). After declaring independency, an important goal of the 
Lithuanian government was to become independent from the Russian personnel and 
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knowledge, and to operate the plant without Russian help (Balmaceda, 2013: 218). In 
the following years Lithuania managed to decrease its dependency on Russian 
support structures for the Ignalina power plant, mainly with technical support from 
Sweden. Nevertheless, the power plant was still not fully independent from Russian 
support since the fuel that was necessary to keep the plant operational was only 
produced in Russia (Balmaceda, 2013: 217).  
Closing the Ignalina power plant was a non-negotiable condition for Lithuania’s 
accession to the EU. While the Lithuanian government agreed to close this nuclear 
plant, starting in 2005, it continued to voice its concerns about the increasing 
dependency on Russian gas and oil imports when it loses 70% of its energy 
producing capacity, the total share of this plant in Lithuania’s total energy production 
at that time (Augustis et al. 2011: 8). Looking at the data of Lithuanian energy imports 
after the closing of the nuclear power plant, the Lithuanian government was correct in 
claiming that Lithuania would be more dependent on energy imports, energy imiports 
increased with almost 30% (World Bank, 2017). However, since the power plant was 
operating on fuel that was only produced in Russia, technically Lithuania’s energy 
dependency did not change as drastically as the government pictured it. In relation to 
domestic energy policies, it can even be stated that closing the inefficient Ignalina 
power forced the Lithuanian government to think about its energy diversification.  
Lithuania has been quite successful in diversifying its energy production, mainly 
achieved by its renewable energy strategy in accordance with the EU20/20/20 goals,  
aiming for a 20% share of renewable energies of the total energy consumption in the 
EU in 2020 (European Environment Agency, 2017). Acquiring different forms of 
renewable energy brought a number of obstacles along for Lithuania. The main 
obstacle for Lithuania was the high investment costs and a relatively long period 
before the investments are earned back. Similar as for improving energy efficiency, 
the EU provides numerous funds for the stimulation of the use of renewable energy. 
The main financial instrument of the EU has been the ‘feed-in tariff’ mechanism, 
which is a guaranteed and fixed energy price that is paid to producers of renewable 
energy, in order to cover short-term financial losses or low profits caused by high 
investment costs (Gaigalis et al, 2014: 424). 
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Lithuania’s strategy on reaching the EU 20/20/20 goals is documented in the National 
Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP). Like in Lithuania’s action plan regarding 
energy efficiency, EU funds and regulations play a very important role in the NREAP 
(NREAP, 2010: 3). The main goals of the EU funds that were being provided to 
Lithuania from 2007 to 2013 were to modernize the energy transmission and 
distribution systems, and to stimulate the use of energy renewables (European 
Commission, 2008). These funds covered up to 50% of the total project costs. Since 
its EU membership Lithuania received numerous grants to finance projects to 
stimulate renewable energy use in both the commercial and the public sector. Most 
EU funds were being used to invest in sustainable infrastructure for the heat and 
power generation, or to grant fiscal benefits to producers of renewable energy. For 
example, feed-in tariffs were used to stimulate hydro-power, wind energy, different 
biofuels and solar energy (Gaigalis et al. 2013: 429-430, 433).  
After its accession to the EU in 2004, Lithuania experienced a stable increase of 
renewable energy consumption and production. From 2005 to 2014 the share of 
renewable energy in the total energy consumption increased from 17.8% to 28.1%. In 
the period from independence until 2004, a similar increase was achieved, but the 
trend was far less stable (World Bank, 2017). Interesting to note is that after the 
closing of the Ignalina power plant in 2009, there has been no significant increase in 
renewable energy production or consumption, which could be explained by an 
increase in energy imports. Because of this, accession to the EU was fairly 
ambiguous for Lithuania’s domestic diversification and production. Lithuania lost their 
main domestic source of energy production because of their EU membership which 
accounted for the majority of its domestic energy production (IEA, 2017). 
Nevertheless, due to EU agreements and funds Lithuania was able to improve its 
domestic energy production infrastructure, especially regarding renewable energy. 
Numerous projects were started and funded with EU funds to comply with the EU 
20/20/20 agreement to improve the production and use of renewable energy, and 
with significant results. However, an increasing trend in the use of renewable energy 
in Lithuania, while less stable, was already present before Lithuania’s EU 
membership (World Bank, 2017). When it comes to the net effect of EU membership 
on Lithuania’s domestic energy production and diversification, the closing on of the 
Ignalina power plant had a notable larger effect on the domestic production than the 
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diversification programs on renewable energy. Lithuania lost 70% of its production 
capacity by closing the power plant, but the share of renewable energy in total 
production and consumption only increased about 10%. In general, EU membership 
has sorted a negative effect on the domestic production and diversification on the 
short term, negatively affecting Lithuania’s energy security. However, this effect could 
possibly become less strong on the long term when EU goals on the share of 
renewable energy are likely to become more ambitious in the future 
IMPORT DEPENDENCY AND DIVERSIFICATION 
In 2014, around 75% of Lithuania´s net energy was imported from other countries 
(World Bank, 2017). Nevertheless, net energy imports in Lithuania decreased 
steadily since its independence, simultaneously with the increasing energy efficiency. 
According to World Bank data, energy imports started to rise again since Lithuania’s 
EU membership, from 43% in 2004 to more than 75% in 2014 (World Bank 2017). 
Looking only at these numbers, Lithuania’s import dependency increased 
enormously since its accession to the EU, negatively affecting its energy security. 
Nevertheless, numerous attempts have been made to diversify Lithuania’s energy 
imports in terms of suppliers, but also in its infrastructure. An important European 
project for improving diversification in Lithuania was the Baltic Energy Market 
Interconnection Plan (BEMIP). The main goal of the BEMIP was to integrate the 
energy markets of the Baltic States with the energy markets of the other EU 
members. According to the European Commission, connecting the Baltic energy 
market with the rest of the EU should be achieved by the development of (1) the 
internal market for electricity and gas (2) electricity interconnections (3) electricity 
generation capacity (4) gas diversification of suppliers and sources and (5) oil 
infrastructure (European Commission, 2009: 2). Especially regarding the 
interconnection of electricity networks and gas import diversification, significant 
progress has been made since the implementation of the BEMIP in 2009.  
This progress was mainly achieved by financial assistance provided by the EU, worth 
130 million euro, for the construction of an electricity interconnection between 
Sweden and Lithuania under the name of NordBalt. A similar project on the 
construction of an electricity connection between Poland and Lithuania called LitPol 
was funded with 27 million euro (European Commission, 2009: 6-7). Diversifying 
electricity infrastructure, as well as diversifying suppliers was an important step 
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towards a higher level of energy security for Lithuania, since two thirds of the 
consumed electricity in Lithuania had to be imported after the closing of the Ignalina 
power plant. After the completion of NordBalt and LitPol, these two connections 
provided around 32% of the total electricity imports in Lithuania (Vaida, 2017). 
Diversification also had an important indirect effect on Lithuania’s energy security. In 
2016, the year when the transmission systems NordBalt and LitPol started to 
operate, the average electricity price for industry decreased with 12%, and for 
households with almost 7% (Eurostat, 2017). A logical explanation for this decline, as 
argued by Daivis Virbickas, CEO of the Lithuanian electricity transmission company 
LitGrid, is the increased competition between different energy suppliers in Europe 
(Baltic Course, 2017).  
Another ambitious project that affected Lithuania’s energy security in a positive way 
has been realized shortly after the implementation of the BEMIP. Dependency on 
Russia as a single supplier of natural gas has always been problematic for 
Lithuania’s energy security. Diversifying to other suppliers was considered very 
inefficient, since the infrastructure for the transmission of natural gas between 
Russian and Lithuania was already present. However, there was a strong incentive to 
diversify for the Lithuanian government, namely the high import prices of gas 
compared to neighboring countries. Since the radical liberalization of the domestic 
gas market, which took place to comply with new EU regulations, gas prices in 
Lithuania started rising rapidly (Slesareva, 2016: 233-234). Therefore, supported by 
the EU, Lithuania started to explore the opportunities for the construction of a 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal, allowing the country to import gas from 
overseas, instead of solely through the traditional pipeline system (Republic of 
Lithuania, 2012: 5).  
In 2013 the European Investment Bank and the European Commission funded more 
than half of the total costs of the construction of the LNG terminal to Lithuania, as a 
part of the BEMIP. Currently the terminal is being leased for ten years, after which 
the Lithuanian government has the possibility to buy the terminal (European 
Investment Bank, 2013). The total capacity of this terminal is around 4 billion cubic 
meters on an annual basis. Since Lithuania consumed only 2.44 billion cubic meters 
of natural gas in 2014, this terminal could theoretically make Lithuania fully 
independent from Russian gas imports (Lithuanian Ministry of Energy, 2017). 
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However, gas imported through this LNG terminal is not only meant for the Lithuanian 
market, but was also re-exported to the other Baltic States. Since the opening of the 
terminal, Norway has been the most important LNG exporting country for Lithuania, 
which allowed the country to cut its gas imports from Russia in the first quarter of 
2016 with 63.2% compared to 2015 (Baltic Course, 2016). With the delivery of LNG 
from Norway, the Russian company Gazprom lost its monopoly on the delivery of gas 
to Lithuania. While LNG prices have been higher on average than natural gas prices, 
Lithuania has used the availability of LNG as a tool to force Gazprom to lower their 
prices. As a result, consumer gas prices in Lithuania decreased with 30 % between 
2014 and 2016 (Eurostat, 2017, Reuters, 2014). In June 2017, the Lithuanian gas 
trading company Lietuvos Duju Tiekimas signed another agreement with the US on 
the delivery of LNG, starting in August 2017 (Reuters, 2017). With a broader 
diversification of gas suppliers, prices of gas are likely to decrease even more in the 
future 
Accession to the EU had both positive and negative implications for Lithuania’s 
import dependency and diversification. First, their reliance on foreign energy 
suppliers increased rapidly after their accession to the EU as showed by the data 
from Eurostat. At the same time, Lithuania has been able to improve their energy 
import capacity, which led to decreasing energy prices. Large projects regarding 
import diversification were all negotiated within the framework of the EU, increasing 
the energy diversification of Lithuania and the Baltic region. While the overall import 
dependency increased since 2004, Lithuania has managed to decrease its 
dependency on Russia as the single gas supplier,  
BILATERAL RELATION WITH RUSSIA 
From all the former Soviet Republics, Lithuania was the first country that was 
confronted with Russia´s willingness to use energy as a foreign policy tool. After 
declaring independence from the Soviet Union in 1990, Lithuania faced a three 
month oil boycott from Russia. While this boycott only led to the postponing of 
independence for six months, it had a deep impact on the future relationship between 
the two countries (Balmaceda, 2013: 214-215). By joining the EU, Lithuania would be 
able to counter Russian economic pressure more effectively, supported by different 
EU policy instruments. EU membership could possibly give Lithuania more leverage 
in dealing with Russia’s pressure, but at the same time it could lead to a more 
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assertive stance and growing tensions. In this section I will analyze the development 
of the relationship between these countries since 2004.  
Recently Lithuania has not experienced intensive conflicts regarding energy like 
some other former Soviet republics did. Nevertheless, there have been tensions 
between Russia and Lithuania on numerous occasions. The first incident occurred 
shortly after Lithuania’s EU accession in 2004. As part of a national liberalization 
program, the Lithuanian government decided to sell the national oil-refining company 
to a Polish company, which led to a Russian shutdown of oil deliveries to this refinery 
(Maigre, 2010: 10-11). According to Transneft, one of the biggest state-owned oil 
companies of Russia, this was necessary because the pipeline network between 
Russia and Lithuania needed to be repaired (Baltic Times, 2006). However, 
Lithuanian politicians and foreign analysts consider this as an issue not just related to 
technicalities, but also as a geopolitical move (Grigas, 2016: 50-51). The acts of 
Transneft in this case can be linked to Lithuania’s EU membership, since the 
privatization of domestic energy companies was part of a broader strategy to 
liberalize the Lithuanian energy market in order to comply with EU standards, 
possibly harming the company’s market position.  
Another key moment in the relation between Lithuania and Russia was the 
implementation of the Third Energy Package, a set of policy measures regarding the 
reform and regulation of the gas markets of EU members. The most thorough 
reforms of the Third Energy package, was the implementation of the EU directive 
concerning common rules for the internal gas market (Directive 2009/73). One of the 
main goals of this directive was the ‘unbundling’ of energy networks - i.e. ownership 
of the supplying and distribution networks for natural gas are separated from each 
other in order to prevent monopolistic market structures (Directive 2009/73 : 94). 
Several variations in the strictness of ownership unbundling were possible, but 
Lithuania chose to imply the strictest reforms. This significantly affected the 
monopolist position of the Russian company Gazprom in the Lithuanian market 
because the company would not be allowed to own both supplying and transmission 
systems anymore (Misik & Pracharova, 2016: 593), which led to numerous Russian 
politicians and Gazprom officials publicly expressing their disproval of these reforms 
(Pakalkaite, 2016: 6). As a result, Gazprom started a lawsuit against Lithuania at the 
International Court of Arbitration, but after a short period agreed on the Lithuanian 
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terms of the unbundling of the energy market, pressured by several other EU 
members (Jankauskas, 2014: 49).  
While the unbundling process of the Lithuanian gas market may be considered 
successful, yet another dispute between Lithuania and Russia occurred. Since 2010, 
when the Lithuanian government started to discuss the possibility of the unbundling 
of the gas market, import prices for Lithuania started increasing significantly 
(Pakalkaite, 2016: 15-16). Compared to the prices that the other Baltic States paid, 
the difference was up to 20%. For a short period, Lithuania even paid the highest 
price for Russian gas of all the EU member states (Misik & Pracharova, 2016: 595). 
Valery Galubev, a senior Gazprom official, commented on the difference in pricing by 
saying that it was related to the implementation of the Third Energy Package in 
Lithuania (Kommersant, 2011). Following these events, the European Commission 
started an antitrust case against Gazprom to investigate the possible ‘unfair prices’ 
for several other Central and Eastern European countries that also filed complaints 
(European Commission, 2012). Currently this antitrust case is still pending, but gas 
prices for Lithuania have been cut by Gazprom with 20% in 2014 (Reuters, 2014). 
While this price cut can be explained by Lithuania’s diversification to LNG in the 
same period, the antitrust case could be seen as an extra incentive for Gazprom to 
negotiate with Lithuania over gas prices.  
EU membership gave Lithuania the opportunity to negotiate with, or put pressure on 
Gazprom in defending its interests. Nevertheless, after reforming the domestic gas 
market, the relationship between the Lithuanian government and the Russian state-
company Gazprom became tense, embodied by the legal cases that were started 
and the increasing gas prices. Therefore, it can be argued that EU membership had a 
negative impact on the relationship between Lithuania and Russia. It must be noted 
that the reforms that the Lithuanian government imposed were a lot more thorough 
than was necessary according to EU standards. Moreover, since tensions started to 
rise in 2010, there never have been any threats of a shutdown of energy supplies to 
Lithuania. Negative effects on the relationship between Russian and Lithuania 
because of Lithuania’s EU membership were present on the short term, but its effects 
on Lithuania’s energy security on the long term should not be overestimated. 
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CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
In this thesis, the impact of Lithuania’s EU membership on the different elements of 
energy security have been analyzed. The energy security of many former Soviet 
republics has been challenged since their independence, but Lithuania, as well as  
the other Baltic States, was an exception to this. To explain the variance among the 
vulnerability of energy security between them, I introduced EU membership as an 
explanatory factor. In order to answer the question whether EU membership had a 
positive effect on Lithuania’s energy security, it is important to distinguish between 
long-term and short-term effects. In the short-term, Lithuania experienced minor 
problems regarding its energy security, directly or indirectly caused by its EU 
membership. These problems are mainly related to domestic production 
diversification or production capacity, and to a lesser extend to the bilateral relation 
with Russia. For the other two factors, import diversification and to a lesser extend 
energy efficiency, EU membership has been an important factor for their positive 
development. Because of EU supported investments in import infrastructures, 
Lithuania currently has accession to a wide scale of foreign energy suppliers. Earlier 
scholarly work on energy security in the Baltic States was usually aimed at one 
specific aspect of energy-related policies. By combining these different elements of 
energy security in a qualitative research design, this research showed that there is a 
strong interdependence between these variables, all affecting Lithuania’s energy 
security. Based on my findings, it can be concluded that EU membership has a 
positive effect on Lithuania’s energy security. In terms of policy relevance and 
implications, these findings give important insights in which specific policy measures 
are effective in improving a state’s energy security, and which are not.  
Whether the results of this research are generalizable to the other Baltic States is 
debatable. Country-specific policy measures that were taken had a significant impact 
on Lithuania’s energy security. Each individual case should be researched more 
extensively since decisions of governments or bilateral agreements between states 
may cause a variance between different cases. At the same time, many projects that 
influenced Lithuania’s energy security in a positive way, most notably the BENIP plan 
and the construction of the LNG terminal, had positive on the energy security of the 
Baltic States as a whole. However, since most county specific measures were 
relating to the domestic production capacity of Lithuania, having a negative effect on 
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Lithuania’s energy security, I expect that the conclusion of this research is 
generalizable, and that EU membership does have a positive effect on the energy 
security of the Baltic States.  
A country’s energy security can be measured by using either qualitative or 
quantitative methods. By using a qualitative method for my research, the dynamics 
between the four elements of energy security and how they affect each other became 
clearer than would be possible with a quantitative research design. Problematic for a 
qualitative design as used in this thesis, is that the different elements of energy 
security are valued equally, while it may be possible that some factors have a larger 
effect than others, which makes determining the concrete change in energy security 
in Lithuania more difficult. Defining a clear causal mechanism in which EU 
memberships positively affects the energy security of Lithuania is problematic; Strong 
interdependence between the four different elements of energy security makes it 
troublesome to identify the exact effects of each variable independently. Whether this 
problem could be solved by a different research design should be explored in future 
research. 
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